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ABSTRACT 
 
This article analyses the immigrant-native wage differentials in Spain, which only 
recently has become a host country. The paper exploits the Earnings Structure 
Survey 2006, which is the first nationally representative sample of both foreigner 
and Spaniard employees. Using the Machado-Mata econometric procedure, wage 
differentials between locals and foreigners are decomposed into the gap related to 
characteristics and that due to different returns to endowments (i.e., 
discrimination). We found that, in absolute terms, the latter component grows 
across wage distribution, reflecting the existence of a kind of glass ceiling 
consistent with the evidence of over-education found by previous research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Three decades ago Spanish was a country of emigrants, with more than 3 million 
workers abroad (around 10% of total population), whose remittances financed 
around 10% of imports, contributing to alleviate serious balance of payments 
constraints (Oporto del Olmo, 1992). Dwarfing all expectations, in barely ten 
years, this country has witnessed a gargantuan increase in the number of 
immigrants. According to the Spanish Censuses, the proportion of population born 
abroad rose from less than 2% in 1996 to roughly 12% in 2008, which made Spain 
the country that experienced the largest increase of non-native population in the 
European Union during the last decade, apart from Greece and Ireland (Eurostat, 
2006). However, there has been not only a radical shift in migration flows, but 
also a substantial change in the composition of migrant population, which is now 
predominantly composed by individuals born in countries less developed than 
Spain. The arise of a so different reality makes interesting to look at how migrant 
workers are performing in Spanish labour market, characterized by a high 
employment creation associated to construction and low-productivity services but 
also a high degree of segmentation and fixed-term contracts.  
 The aim of this paper is to analyze wage differentials between native and 
migrant workers in Spain across wage distribution using a nationally 
representative database. In order to do so, we are able to use a recent earnings 
survey containing enough observations of migrants, which overcomes the 
problems present in previous studies. This feature makes the study the first one in 
providing a whole picture of wage penalties faced by foreign workers in Spain. 
Furthermore, we improve previous estimations by analytically computing 
standard errors and interval confidences for wage gaps. 
 The interest of the Spanish case derives not only from the gargantuan 
increase of immigration flows experienced by the country during the last decade, 
but also from the Spaniards’ surprisingly rough attitudes towards foreigners 
according to opinion polls. For example, immigration was considered the most 
important problem in the country, well above unemployment and housing (CIS, 
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2006). In addition, most studies on wage discrimination of migrants are centred on 
Anglo-Saxon, Nordic and Central Europe and Benelux, which have been the main 
host countries in the OECD during the last decades. 
 In spite of the relative novelty of immigration flows in Spain, there is some 
literature dealing with the labour market integration of foreign workers. The 
pioneering work of Dolado, Jimeno and Duce (1997) points out a negligible effect 
of migration on labour market outcomes at the beginning of nineties, when the 
intensity of immigrations flows was very low. A more recent research exploiting 
several data sources –among others, the Spanish Earnings Structure Survey 2002, 
which does not offer coverage of small firms- report similar findings for the 
second half of nineties (Carrasco, Jimeno and Ortega, 2008). Other researchers 
have focused on employment outcomes and occupational segregation of foreign 
workers, documenting different patterns of labour market integration among 
foreign-born workers depending both on socio-economic characteristics and 
country of origin (Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica, 2007; Simón, Sanromá and 
Ramos, 2008). These eventual bad employment outcomes, however, tend to 
improve along with years of residence in Spain (Fernández and Ortega, 2008). 
Finally, the work of Canal-Domínguez and Rodríguez-Gutiérrez (2008) is the 
only one that, to our knowledge, aims to study wage differences between natives 
and foreigners in Spain, finding a substantial pay gap not explained by observable 
characteristics and which does not rise across the wage distribution, as in the case 
of high-educated women –the so-called glass ceiling phenomenon- (De la Rica, 
Dolado and Llorens, 2008). From our point of view, this work has three main 
limitations. First, it is based on the Earnings Structure Survey 2002, which does 
not include any information on firms with ten or less workers, which accounts for 
almost a half of salaried workers in Spain. Second, in 2002 migration flows were 
not as relevant as they would be later and, according to the Spanish Labour Force 
Survey 2002 (2nd quarter), less than 3% of employees had a non-Spanish 
nationality. Finally, this work does not compute any interval confidence for 
estimates or other sorts of ways of determining if differentials across the 
distribution are statistically significant.     
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 Regarding international case studies, there is plenty of evidence of 
important wage differentials between locals and migrants once we control for 
observable characteristics. There is no consistent patter across countries. For 
example, the pay disadvantage faced foreign-born workers is concentrated mainly 
on the bottom of earnings distribution in Sweden (Hammarstedt and Shukur, 2006 
and 2007) and the U.K. (Hunt, 2008) and increases along with wages in the U.S. 
and Australia (Chiswick, Le and Miller, 2008). 
Apart from the role of productivity endowments, several theories can 
explain the existence of wage differentials between locals and migrants.1 The 
departure point is Becker’s (1957) view based on employer’s tastes: some 
employers dislike people from other ethnic groups –modelled as a utility loss 
derived from hiring them- and, in competitive labour markets, if the share of 
prejudice employers is sufficiently large, foreign workers might earn a lower 
wage than locals. Theories of statistical discrimination also offer a framework for 
understanding the existence of wage gaps between natives and migrants based on 
the lack of information or informational asymmetries (Arrow, 1972a, 1972b and 
1973; Phelps, 1972). If there is no perfect information on some migrants 
characteristics (for example, quality of education) or firms have a worse 
knowledge about them, employers will tend to base their hiring and pay decisions 
on observable characteristics of workers, like the ethnic group they belong to. 
Another interesting perspective of looking at this issue is the idea of 
monopsonistic discrimination, inspired by Mrs. Robinson’s (1933) work on 
imperfect markets. Drawing on this framework, Barth and Dale-Olsen (2009) 
suggest that (apparently) unexplained wage differentials are associated to the 
existence of monopsonistic employers and different labour supply elasticities 
across population. Other things being equal, those collectives with more rigid 
labour supplies earn less than otherwise. If migrant workers are employed in 
sectors where firms have some market power and their labour supply is less 
elastic than locals one (for example, because a lower access to unemployment 
benefits and so on), their pay will be lower.     
                                                 
1 See Arrow (1998) for a comprehensive and didactic review. 
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 The rest of the article unfolds in three parts as follows. Section two 
provides a briefly description of the database used in the paper. The methodology 
and results of the empirical analysis are discussed in the third part, while the last 
one summarizes and discusses the main findings of the paper. 
 
2. DATA 
 
Previous studies of immigrant-native wage differentials have been constrained by 
serious data limitations, which, to some extent, are linked to the novelty of 
modern immigration in Spain. However, it should not be neglected that Spain is a 
step behind other OECD countries regarding data sources for analyzing labour 
market and social outcomes. 
This work is based on the Earnings Structure Survey 2006 (EES), released 
by the Spanish National Statistics Institute on December 2008.2 The EES presents 
several advantages over previous databases. Firstly, while neither the European 
Community Household Panel nor the Social Statistics on Living Conditions 
(SILC) –i.e., the household surveys containing information on labour income 
from the middle-nineties- provide an enough large and representative sample of 
foreign works, the EES includes a sample of local and foreign-born employees 
representative at national level and whose size can be considered appropriate for 
analysing foreigners outcomes in isolation. For example, we have more than 
10,000 employees born outside the European Union, which is a sample size higher 
than the whole SILC. In addition, the EES is based on administrative registers of 
employers, which, as Cowell (1995) points out, increases the reliability of wage 
data. In the second place, the EES 2006 overcomes evident limitations of the 
previous wave of the survey, carried out in 2002. Firstly, the EES 2002 only 
contains information on workplaces with ten or more employees, an important 
shortcoming considering the undeniable relevance of small firms in Spain, where 
more than 40% of total salaried workers are employed in firms with less than ten 
                                                 
2 Details on sample design and questionnaires can be found in INE (2008a and 2008b). 
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workers, being one of the countries where small and medium-enterprises account 
for a largest share of employment in the European Union (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of employees working in firms with less than ten workers (2006-2007) 
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Source: Authors’ analysis from 2007 Observatory of European Small and Medium Enterprises Survey. 
 
In addition, this shortcoming might be especially problematic, since, 
according to data from the 2006 SILC, foreign workers are over-represented in 
small firms: while roughly 40% of native employees work in an enterprise whose 
size is ten or less, the proportion of migrants is above 55%. Therefore, it is 
possible to be a selection bias, which, if it is based on unobservable characteristics 
or observable covariates not included in econometric analyses of wages. As an 
illustrative of these possible problems, figure 3, computed from 2006 SILC micro-
data, depicts the wage distributions of workers working in firms with ten or less 
employees and those salaried individuals in the rest of enterprises.  
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Figure 2. Wage distributions by firm size (2006) 
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Furthermore, even if this non-negligible problem were absent, the 
gargantuan increase of foreign population in Spain from 2002 to 2006, makes 
clear that the issue on which this paper is focused deserves a new look anyway. 
Particularly, according to the Spanish Labour Force Survey, while in 2002 people 
with a nationality other than Spanish represents less than 3% of working 
population aged between 25 and 55, in the 2nd quarter of 2006, this group accounts 
form more than 7% of the reference group. 
The database, though meaning a remarkable improvement over previous 
sources of information, presents also some shortcomings. In the first place, those 
people working in the informal sector and employees without a work contract are 
obviously not included in the survey, since these activities are not legal. The same 
applies to undocumented foreign individuals. Nevertheless, these problems are 
probably common to all these sorts of data sources. 
One relevant issue involves the choice of the wage measure to be used in 
the empirical analysis. It is well-documented that migrants are usually employed 
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in jobs involving involve harder tasks or worse working conditions that can 
contribute to reduce wage premia if the principle of compensating differentials (at 
least partially) applies. Therefore, in order to estimate discrimination more 
precisely, we exclude bonuses associated to dangerous working conditions, night 
shifts and supplementary hours from our measure of wage. 
In the second place, it is worthy mentioning that we limit our analyses to 
men between 25 and 55 years old for two different reasons. The first one is related 
to the potential double discrimination suffered by foreign women because their 
condition of both females and migrants. Second, as our database only contains 
information on employees, there is likely to be some selection bias based on 
unobservable characteristics. By restricting our analysis to the group with higher 
employment rates, we try to minimize this bias. 
 A final point that requires some discussion is the definition of migrant. 
The common approach is to consider as migrants those born abroad, as long as 
naturalization rules can differ depending on the country of birth because of special 
agreements with former colonies and so on. This is, for example, the case of most 
Latin American workers living in Spain. Unfortunately, this variable is not 
available in our database, so we have to use citizenship as a proxy for migrant 
status. An additional refinement is made: we only categorize foreigners as 
migrants (and, hence, compare with Spaniards) those people with a nationality 
from geographical regions that, on average, have a lower level of development 
than Spain. In the EES 2006, these cases correspond to South America, European 
countries not belonging the European Union, Oceania, Asia and Africa. 
Furthermore, the rest of countries are not largely represented among immigrants 
and Spaniards tend to associate migrants to people from poorer countries, not 
from other EU rich members or the U.S. or Canada. 
 As a result, our sample comprises more than 96,000 observations, of which 
almost 90,000 correspond to Spaniards and approximately 6,200 are foreign 
workers. 
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3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
This section is divided in three parts. The first one describes the Machado-Mata 
procedure to decompose gaps across the whole wage distribution, while the 
second one briefly summarizes the main descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in the analysis. Lastly, we present the main results of the empirical analysis and 
discuss their implications. 
 
3.1. THE MACHADO-MATA DECOMPOSITION 
 
The seminal contributions made by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) propose 
relative simple econometric techniques to decompose the average gap into a 
component related to observable endowments and another one associated to 
differences in characteristics (interpreted usually as a measure of discrimination in 
labour market studies). The main shortcoming of this approach is related to the 
fact that the gap in a certain outcome between two groups is likely to not be 
constant across the whole distribution of the outcome. For example, a null mean 
gap can be simply the average of large gaps at the tails, which obviously have 
very policy implications than the absence of discrimination. 
 Mainly from Labour Economics, several approaches have been proposed 
to address this issue and compute the gaps conditioned on observable 
characteristics across the whole wage distribution.3 We follow the approach firstly 
proposed by Machado and Mata (2005), though we apply their method following 
the slightly modified but equivalent version suggested by Albrecht, Björlund and 
Vroman (2003) and De la Rica, Dolado and Llorens (2008). The basic idea is to 
construct the counterfactual migrant’s wage distribution that arose if they retained 
                                                 
3 Other ways of analyzing unexplained wage gaps across the whole distribution have been 
proposed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), based on semiparametric estimation methods, 
and Gardeazábal and Ugidos (2005) and Melly (2006) using quantile regression. 
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their characteristics but those endowments were remunerated as local labour 
force. 4 In more detail, the procedure unfolds as follows: 
1) Estimate quantile regressions for 99 percentiles using the native-born 
employees’ dataset.5 
2) For each quantile, take a draw from the locals’ sample and compute the 
predicted log wage for native-born employees at each quantile q, i.e.,  
xnbn(q). Repeat the process for the migrants’ database, calculating the 
predicted log-wage xmbn(q). 
3) Repeat step three M times and, in this way, get a counterfactual 
distribution of immigrants that reflects their remunerations if they were 
paid as locals and the predicted distribution of migrants retaining their 
characteristics and specific returns. 
4) Profiting from the linearity of quantile regression, calculate the 
counterfactual gap, that is, the wage differential associate to coefficients, 
as  xmbn(q) - xmbm(q). 
One task seldom addressed in Spanish literature is the computation of 
standard errors or interval confidence for the counterfactual gap, a non-negligible 
issue in order to test if gaps at different quantiles are significantly different from 
zero.6 Two different ways have been proposed in the literature: bootstrapping or 
deriving an asymptotic expression for the covariance matrix (Albrecht, Van 
Vuuren and Vroman, 2009). To compute bootstrapped standard errors with large 
samples might be computationally cumbersome7, so we have used the latter 
procedure, which, as far as we know it has only been implemented by Albrecht 
and their coauthors. The relevant issue here is to compute the variance of the 
difference between the predicted quantiles of the unconditional counterfactual 
                                                 
4 We evaluate the gap at natives’ coefficients, such as De la Rica, Dolado and Llorens do when 
they address gender discrimination. On the contrary, Albrecht, Björlund and Vroman (2003) use 
the potentially discriminated group –in their work, women- as the reference group. Using this 
alternative assumption, we obtained qualitatively similar results. Estimates are available from the 
authors on request. 
5 We applied a slightly modified version of Machado-Mata’s method, as they take random draws 
from an uniform distribution between 0 and 1. Both approaches are equivalent in large samples. 
6 De la Rica, Dolado and Llorens’s (2008) work is a remarkable exception to this trend. 
7 For example, with our database, it took us more than two hours to run the model in Stata once.  
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distributions. According to Albrecht, Van Vueren and Vroman (2009), the 
variance of ( ) ( )mn mq qθ θ−  is given by 
 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]2 2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
( ) ( ) 2
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
99mn m mn mn m mnn mn m m
q q q q q q
Var q q
f q f qf q f qM
θ θ θ θθ θ
− − −− = + −⎧ ⎫⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
 <1> 
 
This variance can be consistently estimated using the predicted quantiles, 
 and  -which Albrecht and his co-authors prove 
to be consistent estimators of the true quantiles θ
ˆ ( ) ( )m mm q x b qθ = ˆ ( ) ( )m nmn q x b qθ =
m(q) and θmn(q)- and estimating 
by kernel density fmn(·) and fm(·), which represents the density functions of the 
counterfactual distributions evaluated at each percentile. Obviously, the 
population density functions are not known; however, as long as the sample is 
large, it is possible to estimate them using kernel density methods.8 Note that 
standard errors for the difference between  and  will be larger, since 
they are not correlated and, hence, the covariance is null. 
ˆ ( )m qθ ˆ ( )n qθ
The procedure described above allows computing not only the estimated 
gap at each quantiles, but also determining if those differentials are statistically 
significant. 
Regarding quantile regressions, following Koenker (2005), the model to be 
estimated can be expressed in the following way: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )Y q x q qβ ε= +  <2> 
 
where Y denotes monthly gross wages (in logs), x includes a set of employee’s 
observable characteristics, βq is the parameter to be estimated, which captures the 
proportional wage change in the qth quantile conditional on x and εq is a 
disturbance satisfying E(u(q) | x) = 0. Therefore, one can write conditional 
population quantiles Quantq(Y | X = x) as 
                                                 
8 Particularly, we use a Gaussian kernel and the optimal bandwidth suggested by Silverman 
(1986). 
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 ( | ) ( )qQuant Y X x x qβ= =  <3> 
 
β can be consistently estimated by minimising the sum of weighted 
absolute deviations using q and 1-q as weighting factors for positive and negative 
errors, respectively. Finally, the set of covariates includes age, squared age, 
education, tenure, firm size and regional dummies. 
 
3.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The main descriptive statistics of the sample used in the analysis are reproduced 
in table 1. They basically indicate that migrants are younger and have lower 
stocks of human capital –educational level and tenure- than nationals. In addition, 
foreign workers tend to be concentrated in small and medium-size firms. 
 
Table 1. Main descriptive statistics 
 Spaniards Migrants 
 Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation 
Hourly gross wage (euros) 7.08 4.51 5.46 2.17 
Age 38.48 8.42 35.04 7.29 
Tenure 7.15 8.20 1.48 1.99 
Less than primary education 0.0673 0.2505 0.2018 0.4013 
Education     
Primary education 0.1955 0.3966 0.4270 0.4947 
Lower secondary education 0.2892 0.4534 0.2265 0.4186 
Upper secondary education 0.2558 0.4363 0.1001 0.3001 
University 0.1922 0.3940 0.0448 0.2068 
Firm size     
Less than 50 employees 0.5874 0.4923 0.7799 0.4143 
Between 50 and 199 employees 0.1891 0.3916 0.1452 0.3523 
200 employees or more 0.2235 0.4166 0.0749 0.2632 
Source: Authors’ analysis from ESS 2006. 
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3.3. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
 
Selected quantile regressions (at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles) for 
Spaniards and migrants are presented in table 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
Table 2. Estimated results for quantile for male native-born employees (2006) 
 Coefficients (standard errors in brackets) by percentile 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Age 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 0.017 *** 0.025 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  
Squared age 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Education (less than primary education=0)        
Primary education -0.008  -0.006  0.000  0.014 * 0.043 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.013)  
Lower Secondary education -0.005  0.007  0.014 ** 0.021 *** 0.044 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.013)  
Upper secondary education 0.059 *** 0.083 *** 0.114 *** 0.183 *** 0.290 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.013)  
University education 0.228 *** 0.285 *** 0.392 *** 0.578 *** 0.715 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.014)  
Tenure 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.010 *** 0.013 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Firm size (less than 50 employees=0)        
50-199 employees 0.007  0.020 *** 0.022 *** 0.031 *** 0.050 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.007)  
200 or more employees 0.027 *** 0.043 *** 0.081 *** 0.147 *** 0.175 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.007)  
        
Observations 8,970  8,970  8,970  8,970  8,970  
McFadden R2 0.057  0.078  0.127  0.197  0.222  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Note: An intercept and seventeen regional dummies are also included in all regressions. 
Source: Authors’ analysis from ESS 2006. 
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Table 3. Estimated results for quantile for male foreign-born employees (2006) 
 Coefficients (standard errors in brackets) by percentile 
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Age 0.001  -0.003  0.000  -0.015 *** -0.014 * 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.008)  
Squared age 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 *** 0.000 * 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Education (less than primary education=0)        
Primary education 0.006  -0.006  -0.007  0.016 * 0.008  
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.018)  
Lower Secondary education -0.008  -0.009  -0.008  0.022 ** -0.005  
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.018)  
Upper secondary education 0.018  0.037 ** 0.071 *** 0.089 *** 0.093 *** 
 (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.023)  
University education 0.059 *** 0.103 *** 0.138 *** 0.326 *** 0.605 *** 
 (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.030)  
Tenure 0.003  0.007 *** 0.009 *** 0.007 *** 0.023 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  
Firm size (less than 50 employees=0)        
50-199 employees -0.021 ** 0.001  0.004  0.005  0.024  
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.015)  
200 or more employees -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.015 ** 0.010  0.039 ** 
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.019)  
        
Observations 6,240  6,240  6,240  6,240  6,240  
McFadden R2 0.055  0.676  0.050  0.065  0.097  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Note: An intercept and seventeen regional dummies are also included in all regressions. 
Source: Authors’ analysis from ESS 2006. 
 
Estimates of the wage gap associated to differences in returns –that is, the 
component aiming to proxy for discrimination- are computed following the 
method described above and presented in table 4 and figures 3 and 4. The 
counterfactual gap is significantly different from zero across the whole 
distribution. In general terms, our results point to the existence of increasing wage 
differentials across the distribution conditioned on endowments; pointing to the 
existence of a sort of glass ceiling similar to those described for female workers. 
In fact, previous works have identified a higher degree of over-education among 
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migrants than among Spaniards (Fernández and Ortega, 2008). At the bottom, the 
gap is very small, which might be explained by two factors. Firstly, by the 
existence of compensating differentials not remunerated by specific bonuses but 
included in the base wage. As long as immigrants’ jobs can involve riskier and 
unpleasant work activities or environments that yield some wage premium, 
differences at the bottom may be understandably lower. In the second place, our 
database is limited to formal and legal work relations, so all benefits and 
constraints associated to labour market institutions apply here. For example, 
collective agreements and minimum wages (which have considerably risen since 
2004) might be contributing to the existence of a lower gap at the bottom by 
imposing minimum earnings thresholds. However, it is also remarkable that there 
is slight increase of the pay gap around the 20th percentile, which is not easy to 
interpret. A possible explanation, following the arguments of Hammarstedt and 
Shukur (2008) for Sweden, might points to the existence of a group of foreign 
workers who has just arrived to the country and whose human capital endowments 
are not fully transferable to the Spanish labour market, a circumstance that could 
be reinforced by an eventual lack of language proficiency. 
 
Table 4. Estimated raw and counterfactual wage gaps by percentile between local and migrant 
employees (2006) 
Percentile Raw gap (Standard errors in brackets) Counterfactual gap (Standard errors in brackets)
10th 0.094*** 0.047*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) 
25th 0.100*** 0.038*** 
 (0.006) (0.001) 
50th 0.134*** 0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) 
75th 0.257*** 0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.001) 
90th 0.461*** 0.136*** 
 (0.013) (0.004) 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Source: Authors’ analysis from ESS 2006. 
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Figure 3. Raw wage gap between local and migrant employees in Spain (2006) 
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Note: Dotted lines depict 95% confidence intervals for estimated wage gap. 
Source: Authors’ analysis from EES 2006. 
 
Figure 4. Wage gap explained by differences in returns between local and migrant employees in 
Spain (2006) 
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Note: Dotted lines depict 95% confidence intervals for estimated wage gap. 
Source: Authors’ analysis from EES 2006. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Immigration has become an increasing relevant phenomenon in Spain, a country 
that had been country of emigrants until few years ago. In this paper, we have 
analyzed the native-immigrant wage gap across the whole distribution using the 
M-M decomposition. The main contribution of the paper has been for first time to 
address the issue using a representative survey of labour force and not limiting the 
scope of the analysis to large firms, which are not numerous in Spain and among 
which foreign-born workers are under-represented. In addition, standard errors for 
counterfactual gaps have been also estimated, a task neither addressed by previous 
researches on the topic in Spain nor by most other national case studies. 
 The main finding of the paper is the existence of a relevant glass ceiling 
for foreign workers from developing countries living in Spain, that is, the wage 
gap significantly grows across wage distribution. 
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